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Structured Abstract
Purpose
This article discusses exploratory research into the perceptions of British Muslims towards Islamist
ideological messaging to contribute to the general debate on ‘radicalisation’. The article discusses
the findings of discussion groups in the light of research previously undertaken in the
propaganda/psychology fields, from the perspective of Reversal Theory.
Methodology/approach
Four focus groups were undertaken with a mixture of Bangladeshi and Pakistani British Muslims
who were shown a selection of Islamist propaganda media clips, garnered from the internet. The
research is intended to provide exploratory indications of how British Muslims receive Islamist
communication messages in order to provoke further research in this critical field.
2Findings
We propose that Islamist communications focus on eliciting change in emotional states, specifically
inducing the paratelic-excitement mode, by focusing around a meta-narrative of Muslims as a
unitary grouping self-defined as victim to Western aggression. Early indicators are that some genres
of Islamist propaganda may be more effective than others in generating these emotional change
states (e.g. cartoons) and some groupings appear to be more susceptible than others. We conclude
that our British Muslim respondents were unsympathetic to the Islamist ideological messaging
contained in our sample of propaganda clips.
Research limitations/implications
The research highlights the difficulties in undertaking research in such a sensitive field. We propose
a series of four testable propositions to guide future research looking specifically at whether those
subjects who are more likely to be excited by Islamist communication include those with weakly
held identities, younger males, those feeling contempt for Western culture, and the use of specific
media genre formats.
Originality/value of paper
The article provides an insight into how British Muslims might respond to Islamist
communications, indicating that whilst most are not susceptible to inducement of paratelic-
excitement, others are likely to be, dependent on which genre of clip is used, the messages
contained therein, and who that clip is targeted at.
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3The Dark Side of Political Marketing:
Islamist Propaganda, Reversal Theory and British Muslims
Introduction
Political marketing is a key sub-discipline traditionally associated with the marketing of politicians
and candidates, and its methods and techniques, e.g. opinion polling, focus grouping, negative and
permanent campaigning, persuasive audio-visual communications, have increasingly been used by
social pressure groups to change government policy. It is also recognised that political marketing,
especially the American negative campaigning variety, is a marketing/propaganda hybrid
(O’Shaughnessy, 1999). Nevertheless, there is still limited recognition of the importance of emotion
in voter decision-making. A more recent, and disturbing phenomenon is the use, albeit in its
infancy, of emotional messaging by terrorist groups to recruit and retain members and advocate their
own causes. This article seeks to identify how terrorists groups are using emotional messaging, in
particular, through audio-visual broadcasts made available on the internet and through broadcast
media channels, to recruit and retain members and advocate Islamic extremism amongst select
constituent groupings.
International terrorism is a key political issue in Britain today. A Populus/Times Muslims Poll
(2005) found that 12% of 18-24 year-olds believes suicide bombings against civilians to be
legitimate. The next year the same poll found that 13% of British Muslims believe that the four
suicide bombers of July 7, 2005 should be regarded as ‘martyrs’ while 7% said that attacks on UK
civilians could be justified in some circumstances (The Times, 2006). Such attitudes amongst British
Muslims could indicate a reservoir of potential Al Qaeda and Muslim fundamentalist recruits.
However, a significant leap in belief needs to take place from indicating support on an opinion
survey to sitting on a packed train with a suicide belt-bomb. Al Qaeda as an organisational group
has been defined in three ways: 1) as a hard core of militants based in Afghanistan providing other
Islamic militant groups around the world with funds and/or training like a university disbursing
‘grants’ for selected military operations and facilities like libraries and Islamist teaching facilities
and 2) like a venture capitalist supporting and funding selected ideas for military operations
submitted from a variety of interested Islamist groupings and 3) an organisation funding military
operations and propaganda production like a TV production company commissions films, books and
newspaper articles from freelance operators, often rejecting the majority (Burke, 2007). Given these
commercial parallels, we can talk of the use of marketing/propaganda methods by terrorist groups,
which so often accompany atrocious acts like the 9-11 attacks in the USA or 7-7 bombings in the
UK, as the ‘dark side’ of political marketing. There is anecdotal evidence that the process of
radicalisation can occur over a short time period (Razzaque, 2008). If we believe the British
broadsheet media, Islamic youth are radicalised by perambulatory DVDs and other media aimed
directly at them (Jaber and Allen-Mills, 2005; Wheatcroft, 2006). Central to our thesis is the notion
that terrorists and their backers are not born but persuaded through propaganda (Powell, 1967),
particularly where this is a call to identify with the aims of war (Bernays, 1942; Finch, 2000).
We are evidencing political marketing/propaganda techniques being used to inculcate in vulnerable
sections of society an attitude or state suggesting suicide bombing and the violent Jihadi mission of
Islamists is honourable and just. Not surprisingly, this secondary narrative concerns many
government policy-makers. The question we seek to begin to answer is: are British Muslims
persuaded by Islamist propaganda? If so, how might that be and via what genre of media
communication? Previous attempts to determine how propaganda imagery and messages are
received by their audience have been superficial although O’Shaughnessy (2002, 2004) examined
the content of Al–Qaeda videos before and in the immediate aftermath of ‘9-11’, considering such
persuasive devices as the use of fast-moving imagery, ‘atrocity’ propaganda, anti-Semite hyperbole,
4and editorial sleight of hand. But no-one has yet investigated how British Muslims per se perceive
or receive militant Islamist propaganda material.
The Communicative Environment
That a threat to British Muslims is seen to exist is unquestionable. The UK Home Office began to
track Muslim opinion through seven working parties after the July 2004 terrorist attacks (House of
Commons, 2006)1. What the report fails to cover is the core issue of how such ostensibly ordinary
Muslims become terrorist sympathisers or what role propaganda plays in apparent personality
change. Michael (2004:12) recognised ‘signs of exclusion’ in young Pakistani Muslims. The
FCO/Home Office report on Young Muslims and Extremism (Michael, 2004), found three factors
which attracted some to extremism: 1) anger at the ‘double standards’ of British foreign policy in
relation to Palestine and Iraq for example, 2) alienation following attempts to integrate modern
Islamic identity with modern secular society, and 3) activism to reduce various perceived ills in the
society around them. Yet again despite this prognosis, the question arises as to how such apparent
ordinary Muslims empathise with suicide-bombers and martyrs-elect. What role, if any, does
propaganda plays in framing these anxieties and does it per se radicalise British Muslims?
One theory which may help is Reversal Theory (Apter, 1984, 2007). Its merit is that, unlike the
theories of mainstream cognitive psychology, it is not grounded in an assumption of rational
process. Given that much of the existing literature in political marketing assumes rationality and
focuses principally on voting at present, rather than generating motivational support or activism per
se, Reversal Theory provides some understanding of how terrorists seek to develop their activist
support bases. The basic assertion is that as arousal increases, it becomes either increasingly
pleasant or increasingly unpleasant. When the high arousal is pleasant, there is excitement, and
when high arousal is unpleasant there is anxiety. Similarly, when low arousal is unpleasant, there is
boredom and when low arousal is pleasant, we have relaxation (O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy,
2002). This means that there are two ways of experiencing arousal, one which runs from relaxation
to anxiety as arousal increases, and the other that runs from boredom to excitement as arousal
increases. The thesis of Reversal Theory is that we often switch between these two modes. Thus,
people seek the arousal of excitement or avoid the arousal of anxiety. In Reversal Theory, the two
modes of high arousal-excitement and high arousal-anxiety are mutually exclusive in that people
can be either in one mode or the other but not both simultaneously (O’Shaughnessy and
O’Shaughnessy, 2002). The theory speaks of a ‘telic’ mode, where goal achievement is paramount,
or a ‘paratelic’ mode, where the enjoyment of the activity itself is primary. This would be relevant
to terrorism, where the intrinsic satisfaction of carrying out the task, vengeance gratified, is often
more important than the instrumentality of the terror act. The attractions of terrorism, it follows, are
intrinsic not instrumental. Terrorists frequently fail in their actions. Yet participants do not view
themselves as failures. We therefore suggest that terrorists are acting within a paratelic mode, which
is associated with a high arousal of excitement. In other words, the excitement of terrorist
involvement may well be the key to its very attraction (see Apter, 2007, on the role of excitement
inducement for those seeking to involve themselves in military combat and crime).
In the telic mode, on the other hand, the reward lies with the sense of moving nearer towards the
accomplishment of some objective rather than the involving nature of the activity itself: in telic
mode we avoid anxiety with its concomitant high arousal. Anxiety is absent in the paratelic mode,
but it is often present in the telic mode, while conversely, there is always some excitement or
boredom in the paratelic mode but not in the telic mode. Thus, we can discount the telic mode as
usually irrelevant for would-be terrorists.
1 Fifty-two people were killed (including the four suicide bombers) and more than 700 injured by 4 separate, co-
ordinated, suicide bomb attacks on London’s transport and bus system.
5The logic of Reversal Theory is that there is a movement between these polarities over the course of
a relatively short time period, or even during a single day. Typically for example, we may be in telic
mode, focused and goal oriented, in the office, but in paratelic mode, sensation-seeking, during the
weekend evenings. But, as Apter (1984) stresses, individuals can be more or less permanently
trapped in one mode or the other. There are people who can never escape the paratelic mode with its
polarities of boredom–excitement, and others are frozen in telic mode, typically for example, those
people we might describe as ‘workaholics’. In applying this to the study of terrorism and terrorist
propaganda, we believe that Reversal Theory has a critical role to play in leading us to a deeper
understanding of the attraction of terrorism and the (cyber-) texts that terrorists produce for global
consumption to initiate terrorist activism. The value of the theory is as a descriptor of a
psychological condition which yields a predisposition to involvement in acts of terror, and which
terrorist media intuitively exploits to freeze permanently the potential terrorist in the paratelic mode.
They capture its essence and chart a journey from boredom via arousal to excitement. They are
targeted at people who feel trapped by boredom, e.g. inter-generational tension, the tedium of
unemployment, the absence of a vision of the future. The thirst for excitement, this rejection of a
boring life with its sense of entrapment, could act as triggers to join an insurgency and to find out
more about Al Qaeda or other Islamist groupings.
Terrorist media as a genre are part of a totality of cognitive context whose product is the high
arousal of the paratelic mode and may be said to exhibit the following properties designed to induce
and sustain a paratelic mode in conjunction with other stimuli (see Appendix 1):
1) Excitement - The attraction of Al Qaeda is the allure of excitement, the promise of adventure
and thrilling sensations for young men who crave action and glorify heroism.
2) Dynamism - These narratives are dynamic, packed with drama and the consequences of that
action, and are carefully edited for pace and attention span. With their lurid imagery and
logo systems, they can be reminiscent of MTV.
3) Decoding - There is no need for terrorist media texts to be read or decoded through the
agency of some prior tutelage. No real understanding of Islam is needed. Their appeal is to
the theologically illiterate, for example, Islam like all the Abrahamic faiths explicitly forbids
suicide, and yet such media glorify it. In this sense, Al Qaeda for example, is disconnected
from its religious roots and making a universal appeal to a universal male: young men have
always sought these things, otherwise wars could never be fought. We should not
underestimate the power of an appeal whose sole function is to legitimate violent action
without excessive elaboration of the justifications. The target individuals may well know
little if anything about the political situation of their own locality or of the wider Muslim
community and be in no position to know whether it is, in fact, oppressed as suggested or
not. The key point is excitement not politics, and the need is to provide a simple, superficial
justification for adventure.
4) Power - People are attracted to power, powerful individuals and powerful organisations even
if these are evil, and this means a concomitant attraction to the symbols of power. The very
qualities that frighten are those that also attract. Burke (2007) cites Ahmed Ressam, the
failed would-be Los Angeles airport bomber, as actively seeking Bin Laden’s blessing so
that he could credit the attacks to ‘the sheikh’.
5) Alterity – Islamist media create an ‘us’ and ‘them’, alien-like feel. They are a summons to
defend ‘your’ tribe, they romanticise violence, and they portray the enemy as the
quintessence of evil. It is important to understand the exclusionary nature of this appeal and
the huge importance of justified, gratified revenge.
6Methodology
Technique and Sample
Given our intention to explore the emotional resonance of Islamist media clips with British
Muslims, we used a discussion group methodological approach given its usefulness in the context of
developing collective testimonies and group resistance narratives (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 641),
and because the format “provides support to its members in the expression of anxiety-provoking or
socially unpopular ideas” (Goldman, 1962). The discussion group was introduced into the social
sciences in the 1940s to investigate reactions to war time radio programming (Merton, 1987) and
political scientists, and practitioners, increasingly use this approach to understand audience political
perceptions and motivations (see Gould, 1999), because “they are important for making audible the
voices of oppressed people who are demanding to be heard” (Madriz, 2000). The notion that
discussion groups will not work for sensitive topics is a myth (Morgan, 1998). But group
discussions have another vital role in qualitative research: they are particularly useful in proposition
development (Bellenger, Berhardt and Goldstucker, 1976) in the early developmental stage of a
discipline. Therefore, our primary aim is to: Explore the perceptions and emotional responses of
selected British Muslim groups towards Islamist ideological broadcast messaging with a view to
informing future research in this field.
We aimed to determine what would be respondents’ perceptions of, and emotional responses to, the
content, message and style of the clips. Four discussion groups were conducted: two in London (in
Edgware, Bangladeshi women 18-36 years old and Tower Hamlets, Bangladeshi males 18-34 years
old), one in the Midlands (Birmingham, Pakistani men, 18-28 years old) and one in Dewsbury
(Pakistani mothers, all ages) in areas of relatively high Muslim population density (see Table 1).
Table 1: Group Characteristics
GROUP REGION NATIONALITY/RELIGION AGE GROUP
SIZE
COMMENTS
Young
Male
Edgware, North
London
Bangladeshi Muslim 18-34 4 Comprised 3 Muslims and one revert2.
Young
Female
Tower Hamlets,
East London
Mixed Muslim 18-36 9 Comprised women who had either recently
arrived from a Muslim country or had been
born in the UK. Some wore the hijab,
others did not.
Female
Mothers
Dewsbury, West
Yorkshire
Pakistani Muslim All
ages
8 2 members illiterate in English/Urdu, 3
English illiterate but could speak Basic
English and Urdu literature. Most resident
in the UK for 20 years or more.
Young
Male
Birmingham,
East Midland
Pakistani Muslim 18-28 10 Convened a month after the other 3 groups
in August 2006 but before the Heathrow
bomb scare.
Respondents were recruited by Ipsos MORI street interviewers in groups of 4-10 participants, with
each group lasting 1½ to 2½ hours, using trained Muslim moderators briefed on the sensitivity of
the research and the need to reassure respondents (Kay, 2001). Some would-be respondents were
wary of participating. Although, the discussion group approach is not without fault (Mitofsky,
1995), for this stage of theory development and given the topic of the research, the group discussion
approach was enlightening. Respondents were questioned on their perceived identity, the types of
Islamist communications they had seen, and their views of the selected audio-visual clips. Five clips
were used, selected from a broad range of Islamist ideological media material (hosted by the Middle
East Media Research Institute - memritv.org) to reflect a range of genres of audio-visual material
that Muslims might be subjected to in their daily lives (see Appendix 1 for a brief synopsis of each
2 He became a practising Muslim later in his life and referred to himself in this way rather than as a convert, which he
might have taken to mean that he was not a ‘good’ Muslim at some point previously.
7clip). Given the exploratory nature of this research, our selection was neither exhaustive nor
scientific, instead we seek to explore certain genres of media clip to determine whether some might
have more emotional resonance than others. The group discussions were audio-taped and fully
transcribed. Discussion groups have limitations in that their findings are not generalisable across the
population (see Mitofsky, 1995) but they are very useful in development of theory and hypotheses.
It is possible that those with extreme views refused to take part, so there might be an element of self
de-selection, which was possible with our Bangladeshi male group. Respondents’ views may also
have been influenced by the very material the participants watched and discussed: the so-called
‘Hawthorne’ effect3, especially where they had not seen this or similar material previously.
Findings
Our findings provide an understanding of what the Islamist message senders might be trying to
convey to our Muslim respondents and how these messages emotionally resonated. Given the focus
of the research, it is important to understand the cultural background of our subjects. To the
respondents, practising Islam was ‘Jihad’ in itself: the struggle to internalize and practice the
religion as it permeates their daily lives and interactions, and their identity. For men, it was how
they interact with women, i.e. things they were/not allowed to do and say in the company of women
and suppression of sexual thoughts. Being Muslim was described variously as a way of life”, and
“…the way we eat, the way we sleep, the way we go to the toilet, the way we get up in a morning”.
When considering their own identity, most respondents had complex juxtaposed notions of these
which might actually make some more susceptible to Islamist messaging than others, as these
comments from the discussion groups indicate:
“If I were to go to Bangladesh … it would feel just like a holiday … I am part of England and I
love it.”
“On paper I am Muslim and British and my parents are Pakistani. What comes first is Muslim,
Pakistani, and then British. I don’t really know what being British is.”
“Getting a British passport doesn’t make you British.”
But there was also some evidence of contempt for what Muslims perceive to be British culture
because “our values are not to drink, not to go out and fornicate, and here there is a bit of a culture
to go out clubbing.”
The media clips, readily available to all over the internet, are distributed by two source
organisations: a virtual state, Al Qaeda, and a real one, Iranian terrestrial television, and both glorify
terrorism. Yet, there are no perceptible ethical differences in the nature of their proselytisation. The
distinction lies in the quality of the production values. These media clips are modern. God is
marginal in the rhetoric. The clips parody western cultural and communications norms, probably not
ironically, representing the cultural interface product as hybridized text emanating from a blend of
East and West. Behind both militant Islamist propaganda products lies the conviction of a global
conspiracy against Islam. The line of argument indicates that global conspiracy must be met by
global conspiracy, and it is the perception of a global war to win the freedom and independence of
what the propagandists see, and wish to establish as, a trans-national Muslim nation – the umma
ruled by a Caliph. Ideas which simplify and universalize are always problematic but they have the
attraction of creating sharp coherence out of a complex, contradictory and nuanced world (Ellul,
1973; O’Shaughnessy 2004). Terror organizations are willing to communicate as never before, to
articulate their deeds through propaganda:
3 The idea that the very act of interviewing effects what you are measuring was confirmed by a series of celebrated
experiments in productivity in the US between 1924-33 by psychology researchers at the Hawthorne works of the
Western Electric Company in Chicago. The effect is to social science what Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle is to the
natural sciences: namely measuring an effect alters that effect through the very act of measurement.
8The aim of modern propaganda is … to provoke action … to make the individual cling irrationally to a process
of action. It is no longer to lead to a choice, but to loosen the reflexes … to arouse an active and mythical
belief (Ellul, 1973).
Consequently, there is now a much greater volume of communication of Islamist Jihadi messaging,
particularly using media clips across the internet (Kimmage, 2008). Given our hypothesis that
propagandists might be seeking to use Islamist communications to convert bored British Muslims
into suicide bombers, we evaluate the discussion groups’ responses, with a view to determining how
this messaging is emotionally received by our subjects.
The Impact of Propaganda
The responses of the members of the discussion groups to each of the five media clips are outlined
in Table 2. Without sharing the culture of which these symbol systems are a part, westerners
(including Muslims born in Britain) are deaf to some of their meaning and nuance, for example
where the wrongs done to Palestinians becomes the universal symbol of all Muslim weakness and
victimhood. The Iranian cartoon and ‘martyr’ video offer another instance in recalling the murder of
Palestinian boys. Martyrdom is the big idea, the meta-narrative, that underscores the imagery
watched by our respondents. Martyrdom is also central to the myth-making process surrounding
historical propaganda as Nazi propagandist Goebbels recognised as his key task (Baird, 1992).
The very brevity of these media clips suits modern attention spans and sound-bite culture. The
images constitute a pastiche of Western consumer media, striking some false chords and
encountering credibility problems with more media-savvy British Muslim youth. These are after all
visually literate contemporary British citizens whose primary identifier may be Islam but whose
perceptual conditioning influences are those of modern Britain. In the lives of the respondents, there
are many competing information systems on Islamist and Islamic issues inside communities,
families and kinship groups. We can talk of a competitive marketplace of information to win ‘hearts
and minds’, accessible to all its protagonists whether propagandists, governments or special-interest
groups.
9Table 2: Emotional Responses
CLIP CHARACTERISTICS RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS
Clip Genre Distribution Young Males, North
London
Mothers,
Dewsbury
Young Females, East
London
Young Males Birmingham
1 Music
Video
Parody
IRIB/Jamm-e-
Jam3 (Iran)
Characterised as
Bollywood style
overly-dramatic, with
poor music and
attractive lead
characters. Triggered
laughter given
modern/funky format
and overly anti-
Western content. Not
felt likely to influence
UK Muslims despite
clear message
encouraging suicide
bombing.
Did not understand
it, even with the
(English) language
translation, thinking
it to be love story.
Felt it was “a recruitment
video targeted at young
men”. Felt empathy for
people who are “forced”
into taking such actions
and have nothing to live
for. This group felt that
the message was for
mothers/wives/sons and
that Jihad was about
sacrificing their loved
ones for a cause.
Respondents’ comments
guarded, intimating their
understanding of the
bridegroom’s plight, their
“understanding of why some
people feel compelled to
attack Israel”. People who
see this “might copy” the
act, reacting to the message
that “the Western world is
corrupt”.
2 Animated
Cartoon
IRIB/Jamm-e-
Jam3 (Iran)
Clip “lacked a sense
of reality” and was not
“likely to influence
young Muslims”
because it was
animation.
Induced powerful
reaction, visibly
changing moods:
one lady had tears in
her eyes. They could
“feel the pain of the
boy, as they were
mothers
themselves”. Clip
urged young people
to “take action”
because of perceived
injustice: “If kids
see too much of this
stuff they take it on
board, kids are
susceptible”.
Clip saddened this group
at the helplessness of the
situation and the
desperation of children
and families living in
camps. The clip showed
“the reality of what is
happening”. Respondents
with children were
particularly worried
about the impact the
clips would have on their
own children describing
it as “sinister”.
One respondent likened
animation to reality of the
Muslim’s plight, indicating
susceptibility to the
message: “There seems to be
such a disparity between the
Israeli soldiers with their
machine guns and the
children with their stones. I
know it is a cartoon but there
is the reality as well”.
“Capturing military soldiers
[sic] is completely different
from killing average people
living in the suburbs of
Palestine”.
3 Al-
Zawahiri
‘Talking
Head’
Al Qaeda/Al
Jazeera (Qatar)
Clip triggered ‘head-
nodding’, in
agreement. Leader felt
to have spoken the
truth about young
Muslim children dying
at the hands of the
West. Content not
considered factual by
most and should be
taken with a “pinch of
salt”. Where ‘live’
footage used (Muslims
firing cruise missiles),
respondents felt the
message likely to
muster support
amongst those
Muslims already
corrupted or easily
swayed.
Clip not understood,
as they did not
understand Arabic
and the English
subtitles were too
fast-moving. The
speech regarded as
“boring”.
Clip not well-received.
They felt that the
speeches and images
make the situation worse
for Muslims. Notably,
this group had less to say
than others.
Respondents agreed that
America adopted an
hypocritical and bullying
posture in relation to the
United Nations, in relation
to pushing through
resolutions which allowed
the invasion of Iraq, for
example: “Up to [a] point,
most of what he [Al-
Zawahiri] said made sense”.
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Table 2: Emotional Responses Continued
CLIP CHARACTERISTICS RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS
Clip Genre Distribution Young Males,
North London
Mothers, Dewsbury Young Females,
East London
Young Males
Birmingham
4 Siddiqu
e Khan
‘Talking
Head’
Al Qaeda/Al
Jazeera
(Qatar)
Mohammed
Siddique Khan felt
to have been
“gravely
misguided”, having
been “brainwashed”
by Islamist leaders.
The respondents
were saddened that
he had chosen to
commit suicide.
Some respondents had
seen this clip before.
Condemned violence
and the London
killings. One
respondent indicated
it would be wrong to
judge an individual
for his actions without
knowing “the full
story”. Sympathy
subtly extended to
him. Something must
have happened to him
for him to “take such
steps”. Most felt that
his message was
inherently wrong: “He
says he is killing and
taking revenge in the
name of Allah but
Allah doesn’t tell you
to kill people. It is
wrong.”
Respondents angry,
shocked, “quite
shaky”, to see
educated, articulate
young man in this
action. “Listening
to the words … sent
shivers down my
spine”. Sympathy
for suicide bomber
exists: “how and
what happens to
transform a young
person into a
terrorist?” and
“this feeling of
frustration at not
being heard, you
can see why he
does it”. Clip most
likely persuade
those who already
feel alienated and
aggravated.
Group tended to
disagree with the way he
reacted but sympathised
with his view that
Muslims are being
oppressed. Sidique
Khan’s actions were
projected as a powerful
metaphor, likened to a
“battered wife killing her
husband”. The
implication being that
this was an action
worthy of sympathy and
clemency.
5 Al
Qaeda
News
Bulletin
Al
Qaeda/Internet The faux Al-Qaedanews broadcast
surprised the group,
due to the film’s
modern format. The
group disagreed
with what was said
and felt the ‘news
coverage’ to be
extremely biased.
Clip confused the
group with talk about
Hurricane Katrina and
people suffering and
the firing of guns in
the small inset in the
clip. To this group,
Jihad had multiple
meanings. For some,
it was fighting for
your rights, for others
it was about religious
struggle. Two of the
women claimed to
have never heard of
the word ‘Jihad’.
Group alienated by
the subject’s views
on Katrina and the
joy Al-Zawahiri
felt about the
destruction caused.
They were
saddened by such
events and loss of
life, and the
framing of it as a
supernatural act of
Islamic justice.
They were quite
literally
“disgusted” at his
views although
they felt that such
images could affect
young men.
Group find this a “trite”
and “comical”
communication full of
“black and white ideas”,
although one respondent
felt that he probably did
not receive the full
message because it was
originally in Arabic – a
language he did not
understand - and that
language is full of
imagery.
Applying Reversal Theory
Next, we briefly consider each of the media clips from the perspective of the application of Reversal
Theory and the impact of the media clips on the discussion groups witnessing them, as follows:
Music Video Parody – The clip seemed designed to trigger a paratelic mode, and all those elements
we identify such as dynamic action are present here. Again, the conscious use of an
entertainment format projects excitement. But the symbol-system failed: we have to
distinguish between the encoding, that is to say, an intuitive aim to generate a paratelic mode,
and the decoding, which in the case of our groups was aberrant. The media clip simply did not
work with a Western audience, who found it too crassly manipulative and ingratiating. The
focus of the audiences was on the failure of the symbol system.
Animated Cartoon - The impact here was not on young men, but on Bangladeshi mothers from
Tower Hamlets. It was the only text we showed to have a measurably strong political impact.
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Its overt entertainment format and narrative momentum, its speed, seemed designed to
generate and sustain the paratelic mode. That it succeeded with one segment in such an
unexpected way, demonstrates the subtlety of influence processes, and that they do not fit any
stereotypes. Yet mothers are crucial in Islamic society, in determining its values, in
influencing its socialisation and in turning a blind eye, or providing encouragement, when
sons (and daughters) empathise/sympathise with terror groups.
Al-Zawahiri ‘Talking Head’ – The clip encouraged some general agreement but encountered
credibility problems. Notably, two of the groups felt the message was ‘boring’ and should be
taken with a ‘pinch of salt’ – hardly inspiring the paratelic mode in our groups despite the
explicit call to ‘Jihad’ against the West. Nevertheless, two groups did indicate that the
message might resonate with others since ‘up to a point it made sense’ and might muster
support amongst those ‘easily corrupted’, which psychologists might take as coded language
from some in the groups that they themselves could see merit in the message.
Siddique Khan ‘Talking Head’ – Curiously, the groups whilst not being excited by this message
themselves could see that others might well be, despite the fact that it does not seek in itself to
incite violence but instead to celebrate revenge and to taunt. In other words, the paratelic
mode was not explicitly acknowledged by our group members but they could see how it might
inspire others who feel alienated or aggrieved.
The Al Qaeda News Bulletin - This media clip used a genre which was both mimic and parasitic in
adopting an entertainment format. Again, the narrative drive fits comfortably into the paratelic
mode, but again there was an aberrant decoding by discussion groups and the media clip had
the reverse effect to that intended. Its assumptions, for example, of an indiscriminate hatred of
Americans, and not just the American government, was fundamental to any success it might
have in generating and sustaining a paratelic mode. But this did not happen. Our groups
sympathised with vulnerable Americans. The problem with a western-domiciled audience is
that they interpret this media clip and the others differently from how we might infer a Middle
Eastern audience might, even though both groups are targets of terror states and organisations.
In summary, we propose that Reversal Theory might help to explain the effectiveness or otherwise
of terrorist media clips although the media clips we tested were not effective with our discussion
groups. We began this research with the suspicion that the media clips would be persuasive to some
degree even with a UK Muslim audience, especially young men. In applying Reversal Theory we
sought an explanation of that anticipated persuasiveness. Nevertheless, the symbol systems used
and/or decoded by our subjects were ineffective. This does not undermine the relevance of Reversal
Theory or invalidate our use of it; instead it implies that western-domiciled Muslims are likely to
have limited predisposition to Jihadist sentiment such as that encoded in our test media clips.
Suggestions for Further Research
Given the exploratory nature of our research, we outline a series of testable propositions to develop
the field. In particular, we need to understand how audiences process emotional political ideological
messaging, particularly that from terrorist organisations, from the perspective of Reversal Theory.
Propaganda tends to operate as a coherent integrating perspective, where complex phenomena are
reduced to simple and internally consistent explanatory formula to incite excitement and violent
action. Underlying causal unities are perceived where none exist. A common assumption is that
Muslims are ‘radicalised’ by Al-Qaeda and others by their Islamist propaganda; but, on the other
hand, an alternative thesis exists that radical propaganda might instead actively create anxiety and
repulsion rather than excitement. Do Islamist media communications therefore only appeal to the
pre-committed, refreshing commitment certainly but not aiding the further recruitment of suicidal
foot soldiers? This is a key question. It is unlikely that vulnerable respondents completely take in all
the claims of the propagandist. Rather, they are bored subjects seeking excitement, becoming no
mere object of persuasion but complicit in the hallucination of outrage and justice retrieved. There
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is likely to be a greater susceptibility to Islamic propaganda amongst those who feel the greatest
mismatch between their ‘diaspora’ culture and the ‘British’ culture. This mismatch will probably
cluster around the belief that ‘British’ culture encourages excessive hedonism, fornication and
drinking and other ‘corrupt’ practices. Our adult audiences per se seemed more likely to connect
with the emotional material in the cartoon tested, despite its lack of authenticity. A distinction has
been made, notably by Goebbels, between overtly political propaganda and propaganda disguised as
entertainment (Taylor, 1983). The cartoons might succeed because they function as entertainment,
or more precisely, because the format of a cartoon announces itself as entertainment, lowering
perceptual defences to paratelic-excitement inducement. Therefore, we advocate the following
propositions for further research:
Proposition 1: Respondents with complex ethnic identities are more likely to be excited (i.e.
induced into paratelic-excitement mode) by Islamist ideological messaging than those whose
identities are more strongly held.
Proposition 2: Inducement into paratelic-excitement by Islamist ideological messaging depends
on the subject’s age and gender, with young male subjects those most likely to be induced.
Proposition 3: Subjects feeling contempt for Western culture are more likely to enter the
paratelic-excitement mode after watching Islamist ideological messages than those not feeling
contempt.
Proposition 4: Islamist emotional messaging framed in certain genre formats (e.g. cartoons) is
more likely to induce the paratelic-excitement mode in subjects than others (e.g. ‘talking head’).
More needs to be understood about the relative strengths of the various persuasion paradigms on
offer. In our study, Al-Zawahiri’s style of rational discourse was impactful to some but not to others.
On this evidence, his organization is neither mad nor deluded. Pseudo-reason can be more powerful
as persuasion than crudely emotional appeals. The emotional resonance generated in the Iranian
cartoon was effective because the cartoons functioned at a more abstract and symbolic level.
Therefore, we propose the need to research the impact of this specific format and genre of Islamist
emotional messaging on adults as well as considering the emotional impact of interpersonal forms
of propaganda diffusion. For example, members of the young female group from East London
reported that they had attended events where images of Muslim women and children who had been
killed and mutilated by ‘Western’ forces were shown: “ ... it’s so ironic that the media shows
Muslims in a bad light . . . but when it comes to the Muslim countries being thrashed by Israel, they
don’t show that. It is only in the conferences that you see that”.
The research reveals some difficulties in researching this cross-cultural and sensitive subject. There
are difficulties to researching the persuadability of Islamist ideological messaging; many subjects
may not want to acknowledge their susceptibility to paratelic inducement. There is an argument in
sensitive research environments for respondents to self-report (Tourangeau and Smith, 1996), or for
researchers to adopt the stylistic conventions of an intimate interview to achieve self-disclosure
(Birch and Miller, 2000). There are clearly issues of privacy, confidentiality and ethics surrounding
this type of research (Hill, 1995) which should be further considered.
Conclusion
Our exploratory study highlights how terrorist groups might be using modern media and political
marketing methods to proselytise their message of violent extremism, to induce reversal to the
paratelic-excitement mode in bored and dissatisfied Muslims to recruit supporters to their
ideological cause. Just as democracies use political marketing to recruit voters, so terrorists can use
political marketing/propaganda techniques to recruit sympathisers or even would-be suicide-
bombers (i.e. the ‘dark side of political marketing’). This very idea would be incendiary if we did
not know the communication process and the supporter recruitment processes to be fraught with
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difficulty and ambiguity. British Muslims do not become radicalised solely through a hypodermic
needle method of propaganda injected from afar by terrorist groups using internet-based branded
communications (see Kimmage, 2008). British Muslim opinion is variegated not monolithic, with
strong latent emotions (e.g. sympathy for the Palestinians). Nevertheless, this does not mean that
they are necessarily susceptible to paratelic-excitement inducement and sympathetic to violent
action. Because we have no measure of how tenaciously those views are held or how predisposed
Muslims of different nationalities are to terrorist ideological messaging, we have indicated a set of
four research propositions to explore how Islamist messages are received by British Muslims to
evaluate their emotional resonance and their potential for paratelic-excitement inducement. By this
means we hope to inspire further research in this critical area to aid legitimate governments around
the world to design counter-messaging aimed at inoculating their Muslim populations against
Islamist terrorist ideology designed to inspire and inculcate violence from within.
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Appendix 1
See list of clips used in this study in Table A below, taken from the www.memritv.org website.
Table A – Brief Description and Synopsis of Clips Used Within the Study
CLIP
NO.
DESCRIPTION BRIEF SYNOPSIS
1 A bridegroom turns into a suicide bomber in
an Iranian TV music video, broadcast by
IRIB/Jamm-E-Jam3 (Iran) – Diffused 28th
October 2005 (3 mins 25 secs)
Uses the stylistic conventions of MTV/consumer advertising.
Viewer perceives a pop video or consumer advertisement.
Boy and girl look lovingly at each other, what sounds to be
popular Iranian music is played, yellow ribbons are placed on
the car. Is this a wedding? The soft-focus conventions, the
sexiness, the sentimentality are all apparent, but they are not
used to selling perfume, as increasingly becomes apparent,
they are selling suicide-murder. Something is not quite right.
Much is made of the loving interplay between man and
woman. The car is being loaded. Perhaps they're going on
honeymoon? But what is the mechanical mechanism in the
boot, why is the woman tearful? Then when we see that he is
leaving her to drive towards a military checkpoint we realise
something is amiss. Suddenly the soldier group at the
checkpoint splits in half, terrified: to reveal an Israeli flag
behind them. This is a suicide mission and a suicide bomber.
Parting with the beautiful young woman is symbolic of what
the suicide bomber is leaving on earth.
2 Palestinian Children clash with an Israeli
soldier in an Iranian animated movie,
broadcast by IRIB/Jamm-E-Jam 1 (Iran),
diffused 28th October 2005 (2 mins)
This is an Iranian cartoon based on the Western cultural myth
of David and Goliath. The children in the cartoon are western
in dress, and white. The story begins with children throwing
stones at Israeli troops, one of whom advances towards them
menacingly. Their pathetic little rocks are powerless against
the Israeli giant, who proceeds to machine-gun the lot of
them. He does not figure as a person but as a Cyborg, and his
face seems to be made not of skin but steel. The remaining
boy, infuriated and grief-stricken, picks up a sling, inserts a
stone and throws at the advancing Cyborg. He reels,
dissolves into a skeleton and behind him is revealed a
cadaverous figure of Uncle Sam! These are well-drawn
cartoon figures and the clip exhibits high production values.
It is a sophisticated, stylish, individualistic piece of
animation. Israelis are dehumanized. The subtext is that Jews
murder children and the cartoon functions almost as the
emotional biography of a suicide bomber.
3 Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri claims
responsibility for the London bombings,
discusses elections in Afghanistan and States:
“Reform can only take place through Jihad”,
broadcast by Al-Jazeera TV (Qatar), diffused
19th September 2005 (5 mins 35 secs)
This is a classical headshot ‘political ad’. The physical
argumentation is punchy, well-controlled, and primarily a
political argument. The effect is more politician than rabble-
rouser. His tone is rational. What he offers is an animated
and articulate flow of argument to convince waverers, which
ties all their grievances together. Individually the points made
are plausible. It is the conclusions drawm, that is to say Jihad
is the answer, which are fallacious, apparently flowing from
the cumulative force of the individual propositions but in
reality a complete non-sequitur. The meta-synthesis is that
there is a global conspiracy against Islam, that all attacks on
Islam are interconnected and inspired by the same source.
The message: Jihad is the only rational answer in a Western-
dominated world.
Table A Continued - Brief Description and Synopsis of Clips Used Within the Study
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CLIP
NO.
DESCRIPTION BRIEF SYNOPSIS
4 Mohammed Siddique Khan, one of the suicide
bombers who carried out the London
bombings in a video-taped message: “Our
words are dead until we give them life with
our blood”, broadcast by Al-Jazeera TV
(Qatar), diffused 1st September 2005 (2 mins
27 secs)
Khan was leader of the July 7 bombing group and this clip is
a hymn to revenge and a self-eulogy, recorded before the
atrocity was committed but aired 2 months after in a ‘talking
head’ approach. His message is very simple. You're killing
‘my’ people (the ummah) therefore I'm killing you. The
secondary message is that ‘this is for real’ and that you are
being punished for voting in this government, and presumably
its decision to go to war in Iraq/Afghanistan. The central
premise is that ‘you’ have an irrational hatred of ‘his’ people
and seek to kill them, and that this is all part of a global
conspiracy against Islam. Separate and unconnected conflicts
are linked. Britain thus becomes responsible for Muslims
suffering in, say, Chechnya or Kashmir, even though it has no
power of decision or action there.
5 Al-Qaeda Internet news broadcast celebrates
U.S. hurricanes and Gaza pullout, reports
Zirqawi’s Anti-Shiite campaign and chemical
mortar shells in Iraq, broadcast on The
Internet, accessed September 2005 (4 mins 56
secs)
This clip mimics CNN or BBC World Service news
broadcasts and has contemporaneity in its stylistic posture, to
the point of pastiche. Graphics flash and morph in a modern
fashion, imitating conventional satellite channels. The attempt
is to impress us, by technological sophistication, with the idea
that this is an advanced organisation doing the broadcasting.
To refresh our memory, the clip ends with all slogans and
brand identifiers again revealing a self-conscious
understanding of the role of symbolism and imagery as
meaning signifiers and identity-definers in a media age. What
we encounter after the logo display is a newsreader at a desk
reading the news notes, from the terrorist perspective. This
gives us a jolt since it is ‘their’ perspective on ‘our’ society
using Western symbol systems, such as the symbolism of
news-reading impartiality, where the assumption is that news
is not a social construct but a scientific given. The aim is to
show Al Qaeda in business as a virtual nation complete with
national television news suggesting the globalisation of Al
Qaeda.
